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Abstract: Private standards are among the main measures that can be implemented to 
differentiate food production. Retailers have been particularly active in setting food safety 
and quality systems for the development of their private labels. The purpose of this paper is 
to identify the effects of introducing measures that guarantee the environmental 
sustainability of food production on vertical dyadic relations. We focus our attention on the 
adoption of integrated pest management (IPM) systems that are designed by retailers to 
support private label products, with the aim of studying how these systems affect the 
governance structure of transactions between retailer and farmer/processor. Transaction 
cost analysis is used as theoretical framework to assess changes in vertical coordination 
after the adoption of an IPM system. Four case studies related to food retailers in Italy were 
analyzed to identify changes in transaction characteristics, costs, and governance that are 
related to the adoption of this system. The results show that the introduction of an IPM 
system leads to an increase of transaction asset specificity (i.e., especially of human and 
material asset specificity) among the agents of the supply chain, and a decrease of the 
degree of transaction uncertainty. The variations in transaction characteristics determine 
changes in transaction costs. These changes lead to new hybrid forms of transaction 
governance, namely dyadic contracts, and a centralized organization of vertical relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing consumer interest regarding the quality, safety, and sustainability characteristics of 
food products has led manufacturers and retailers to strongly differentiate their production in terms of 
intrinsic and extrinsic product attributes [1,2]. Private standards are among the main measures which 
can be implemented to differentiate production at the supply chain level; these standards involve all the 
stakeholders operating throughout the stages of the chain. Labels and certification systems can be used 
to provide information to consumers, so as to inform them of the food products’ specific  
attributes [3–5]. In this way, manufacturers and retailers can differentiate their production. 
Retailers have been particularly active in setting food safety, quality, and environmentally-friendly 
standards for the development of their private labels. For these products, retailers often adopt more 
complex systems that go beyond mandatory requirements in terms of standards and level of 
information disclosure [6,7]. Therefore, standards are becoming important instruments that can affect 
the governance of food chain relationships and the efficiency of vertical exchanges; these standards 
require a higher level of coordination among the different supply chain agents [8]. Moreover, the 
growth of multinational food retailers determines the spread of international standards in OECD 
countries, and this phenomenon strongly impacts the food system [9]. 
Retailers use specific standards related to private labels for several reasons: to provide quality and 
safety assurance to consumers; to improve the environmental sustainability of food production; to 
coordinate supply chain operations; to gain access to new segments of demand; to increase and defend 
their reputation; to complement their brands; to define niche products [9,10]. 
By focusing on retailer strategies designed to support private label products, this paper aims to 
identify the effects of measures that guarantee the environmental sustainability of food production on 
the vertical relations of supply chains. More precisely, we concentrate our attention on the adoption of 
integrated pest management (IPM) systems designed by retailers to support private label products, with 
the aim of studying how these standards affect the governance structure of transactions between dyads, 
namely the retailers-processors and retailers-farmers relationships. 
Transaction cost analysis is used as a theoretical framework for analyzing changes in vertical 
coordination after the adoption of an IPM system. Four case studies related to important retailers 
operating in Italy are analyzed in order to identify variations in transaction characteristics and costs, 
and to highlight changes in transaction governance that are connected to the adoption of this system. 
The paper is organized as follows: the legal framework and the economic issues of the IPM system 
are examined in Section 2; the transaction cost approach to the IPM system is presented in Section 3; 
methodological issues are examined in Section 4; results are described in Section 5; concluding 
evidence is presented in Section 6. 
2. The Integrated Pest Management System: Legislation and Economic Issues 
―Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is a long-standing, science-based, decision-making process 
that identifies and reduces risks from pests and pest management related strategies‖ [11]. IPM systems 
are among those measures used in the agricultural sector that reference the concept of sustainable 
development. The three perspectives of sustainability, related to economics, social justice, and 
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environmental friendliness, can be applied to the agricultural sector by introducing the concept of 
―sustainable agriculture‖ [12]. In this context, IPM is an environmentally-friendly approach used in 
crop and livestock production systems so as to efficiently control pests; the approach considers both 
economic and environmental dimensions [13–15]. The present paper makes reference to the economic 
aspects of the IPM system. Specifically, our attention is concentrated on the effects of IPM’s introduction 
on the efficiency of vertical dyadic relationships. 
With regard to the legislation of IPM products, the adoption of such a system is mainly supported 
by private standards elaborated and administered by various subjects of food supply chains (i.e., 
retailers, processors, and other agents), which are controlled by a certification body or collective 
standards. According to the World Trade Organization classification of private standards [16], which is 
based on who defines and codifies the standard, individual company standards are set down by 
individual firms (predominantly large food retailers) and adopted across their supply chains. These 
standards are frequently communicated to consumers as sub-brands on retailers’ private label products. 
The collective international standards are developed collectively by private food retailers, either 
through industry organizations (for example, the British Retail Consortium—BRC) or by coalitions of 
companies that join together for the specific purpose of standard development (for example, the Global 
G.A.P. standard, which concerns integrated farm assurance, livestock transport, chain of custody, etc.). 
Collective private food safety and environmentally-friendly standards are generally linked to systems 
of third party certification, and they are designed to be adopted by organizations in different countries. 
This means that the organization that applies the standard has international relationships. 
At the moment, the legal framework elaborated by public authorities for the adoption of the IPM 
system in the EU is just limited to general principles. There are not yet any specific mandatory rules 
for this system. All the private standards have to respect the European legislation on pesticides, which 
involves: Regulation 1107/2009, which concerns the placing of plant protection products on the 
market, and repeals Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC; Directive 2009/128/EC, which 
establishes a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides; Directive 
2009/127/EC, which amends Directive 2006/42/EC with regard to machinery for pesticide application; 
Regulation 1185/2009, which concerns statistics on pesticides. 
Specifically, the ―pesticides package‖ involves several aspects. First, the legislation concerning the 
production and licensing of pesticides gives precise instructions banning toxic chemical ingredients 
(because of their negative environmental or safety impacts) and regulates the licensing of certain types 
of pesticides for use. Second, the Directive concerning the sustainable use of pesticides emphasizes the 
importance of using IPM in agricultural production as an alternative to the use of pesticides, wherever 
possible. Moreover, the new legal framework also considers the collection of statistics on pesticides, as 
well as new rules for adopting machinery involved in pesticide application. 
With regard to IPM production, European legislation provides general principles of IPM, which 
involve instructions concerning the ―prevention and/or suppression of harmful organisms‖ through 
various environmentally-friendly agricultural techniques, such as crop rotation, alternative cultivation 
techniques, the use of resistant/tolerant cultivars, a balanced fertilization, and the protection of 
important beneficial organisms (Directive 2009/128/EC—Annex III).  
Monitoring procedures are also among the general principles applied during the implementation of 
an IPM system. The Directive stresses the importance of applying adequate monitoring tools to control 
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harmful organisms. These tools include: ―observations in the field as well as scientifically sound 
warning, forecasting and early diagnosis systems, where feasible, as well as the use of advice from 
professionally qualified advisors. Based on the results of the monitoring the professional user has to 
decide whether and when to apply plant protection measures (…). For harmful organisms threshold 
levels defined for the region, specific areas, crops and particular climatic conditions must be taken into 
account before treatments, where feasible. Sustainable biological, physical and other non-chemical 
methods must be preferred to chemical methods if they provide satisfactory pest control‖ (Directive 
2009/128/EC—Annex III).  
With regard to the economic aspects of the IPM system, the main drivers that lead retailers to adopt 
these kinds of systems are connected to different factors. The first driver is connected to the high 
interest of consumers regarding the safety, quality, and environmentally-friendly attributes of food 
products [17–19]. Second, the context in which firms operate is characterized by increased competition 
and pressure (due to the globalization of food supply) [7,10,20]. Third, the increased role of vertical 
coordination in reaching a high level of competitiveness creates new challenges in chain coordination 
and control [21–23]. 
The adoption of IPM private standards leads to several benefits in terms of environmental, food 
safety, and economic dimensions. From an environmental point of view, the adoption of an IPM 
system introduces extensive practices in agricultural and livestock production, which have positive 
effects on the environment. Moreover, the link between IPM and food safety is related to the fact that 
this method reduces the use of chemical residues in food products and, consequently, reduces the risk 
of human diseases connected to the ingestion of these substances. The implementation of IPM systems 
leads also to several economic benefits, which are mainly connected to consumer preferences and 
supply chain efficiencies. 
With regard to consumers, IPM labels can introduce more information concerning the characteristics 
of products, and can make consumers aware of some intrinsic attributes of food products. This 
increased information for consumers allows them to choose products on the basis of their preferences, 
thus reducing market inefficiencies connected to the information asymmetry between consumers and 
producers [24,25]. 
From a chain network point of view, the implementation of an IPM system strengthens vertical 
relations due to different aspects: the increased information transparency concerning the quality 
characteristics of food; the increase of liability among agents of the food supply chain; and the introduction 
of new contract incentives and safeguard conditions via supply chain agreements [21,26,27]. 
The adoption of such systems imply different costs for chain agents, which are mainly related to the 
investments necessary to implement the system, and the variation of costs associated with transactions 
within the supply chain. In the first case, the costs refer, for example, to: the IPM software and 
traceability system, as well as the activity of selecting and training subjects that are able to participate 
in the certified supply chain. In the second case, the variation of costs for the introduction of the IPM 
system should be associated with the negotiation of contractual conditions and the monitoring of the 
IPM system [28]. The description of the transaction cost variations resulting from system 
implementation will be analyzed in depth in the next section. 
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3. IPM System and Transaction Cost Analysis  
From the perspective of neo-institutional economics, IPM standards can be viewed as a set of rules 
that can change the governance of transactions in supply chain dyadic relations. Therefore, IPM leads 
to a redesign of the supply chain’s vertical organization. According to North [29,30], this system can 
be considered as an institution that may have a significant impact on transaction characteristics and 
costs [27]. North conceives of an institution as a set of ―humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints and formal rules‖.  
When applying North and the theoretical framework of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) [31,32], 
a change in governance structure within a supply chain after the implementation of IPM is seen as a 
consequence of variations in both transaction characteristics (i.e., the level of asset specificity, the 
degree of uncertainty, and the level of frequency) and the related costs (i.e., information, negotiation, 
and monitoring costs). 
Asset specificity occurs when both the supplier and the buyer are closely bound to the transaction 
(as a result of facing irrecoverable specific investment costs). More precisely, the two transacting parts 
are linked by a strong bilateral dependency, even if the part that made the higher investment remains 
locked into the transaction. 
The hypothesis we test concerns the reorganization of the supply chain for the application of an 
IPM system. We predict that such reorganization should lead to a growth of asset specificity that is 
connected to the higher level of bilateral dependency between dyads of the supply chain.  
The degree of uncertainty stems from the inability of the participants to identify all relevant features 
of the exchange in order to assess ex ante the value of the transaction, and from the difficulty of 
drafting clauses that allow for redefinition ex post. The transaction uncertainty may derive from several 
factors, such as the information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the stochastic nature of some 
events or the bounded rationality of individuals [21]. The implementation of an IPM system should 
provide a decrease in the degree of transaction uncertainty because of the greater amount of 
information exchanged within the supply chain [27]. This transparency can be connected to: a 
reduction in the number of agents involved in the system; more direct relationships between farmers or 
manufacturers with retailers; and the increase of information exchanges along the supply chain. 
Moreover, a higher level of transparency tends to increase trust among the agents of the supply chain. 
The frequency of transaction is related to the number of repetitions of a transaction in a given period 
of time. The frequency of transactions should not be affected by the implementation of an IPM system. 
The changes in transaction characteristics should determine the variation of transaction costs, such 
as information, negotiation, and monitoring costs. According to Furubotn and Richter [33], 
―transaction costs include the costs of resources utilized for the creation, maintenance, use, change of 
institutions and organizations (...). When considered in relation the transfer of existing property rights 
and establishment or transfer of contract rights between individuals (or legal entities), transaction costs 
include the costs of information, negotiation and enforcement‖.  
Information costs take place during ex ante bargaining and include, for example, expenditures 
related to the time needed for identifying the most suitable suppliers, or for collecting information 
concerning the price of the product/object of the exchange, as well as its features, etc. Negotiating 
costs occur during negotiation; the size of these costs depends on the degree of difficulty associated 
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with defining contractual conditions, such as payments, shipping, price, quality of goods or services, 
and so forth. Monitoring costs also arise subsequent to transaction formalization, and include all the 
activities aimed at verifying the maintenance of commitments made in an agreement. The monitoring 
costs are intended to prevent opportunistic behavior by individuals. 
The modifications of both transaction characteristics and costs affect the governance of transactions 
in supply chains (Figure 1). In other words, the choice of organizational governance form is seen as a 
way of managing the costs of information, monitoring, and negotiation, and is affected by transaction 
characteristics. According to Barney and Lee [34], there are different criteria in making governance 
choices, which can also be analyzed through other complementary theories, such as real option logic 
and knowledge-based theories. Moreover, Leiblein [35] builds up a conceptual framework for studying 
organizational governance decisions; the framework is based on the assumption that the choice of 
governance for transactions affects both the creation and the appropriation of economic value. 
Figure 1. The governance structure of supply chains.  
 
Williamson [36] pinpoints three main modes of transactional organization: market, hybrid forms 
(contracts), and hierarchy (vertical integration).  
The market relies on price and competition to coordinate transactions, whereas hierarchical 
contracts refer to administrative controls that coordinate transactions [37]. Generally, TCE assumes 
that the market provides a more efficient mechanism for managing transactions than hierarchical 
solutions, even if certain situations increase the costs of market exchange and make it necessary to 
move toward more integrated forms of transaction governance. These situations are mainly connected 
to the risk of opportunistic behavior of economic agents that, in a context of bounded individual 
rationality, is affected by the level of transaction asset specificity (i.e., with respect to the site, 
physical, human, temporal, and brand name asset specificity) or uncertainty (e.g., uncertainties 
concerning the market, suppliers or technology) [35]. 
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Focusing on asset specificity, empirical research has provided strong and consistent support for the 
theorized relationships between transaction asset specificity and the governance of vertical 
relationships [38–41]. When no asset specificity exists among economic agents, the high transaction 
costs connected to hierarchy place the hierarchical approach at a disadvantage compared to the market 
approach. However, the cost differences between markets and hierarchy narrow as asset specificity 
builds up. Moreover, hybrid forms are viewed as contracting modes of organization that are used when 
asset specificity among the economic agents exists, but transaction costs are not high enough to justify 
the cost of hierarchies. In this case, specific provisions are set up in order to control the opportunistic 
behavior of economic agents. 
The literature has differentiated different types of hybrid forms of transacting, depending on the 
transaction characteristics, as either formal contracts or verbal agreements [36]. In the food chains, it is 
possible to distinguish a variety of hybrid forms of transacting with different levels of vertical 
coordination. According to Fischer et al. [42], these forms include: relational contracts, written contracts, 
and cross-sharing holding arrangements. Another form is represented by inter-professional agreements. 
Relational contracts are based on repeated exchanges between economic agents; trust and reputation 
play an important role in this organizational form. In the written contracts, the conditions of the 
agreement are formalized with a precision level depending on the information available and the 
contract life; this agreement has legal effects. In cross-sharing arrangements, the economic agents 
involved in the exchanges are independent but they share ownership rights [42,43]. Moreover, inter-
professional agreements refer to framework agreements, signed by producer organizations and industry 
confederations, aimed at establishing the general conditions of economic exchange in a specific sector. 
According to the literature, the choice of governance structure for vertical relationships and  
quality labels are inter-related. Avezedo and Santos Silva [44] investigated the variation of vertical 
coordination after the introduction of a private brand supported by franchising. Moreover, Gonzalez-
Diaz et al. [45] and Raynaud et al. [43] study the relations between the governance of vertical chains 
and the introduction of different quality labels. Raynaud et al. find in their empirical results that the 
supply chain governance structure is influenced by the type of quality label chosen. More precisely, 
quality labels based on reputational capital are more likely to be associated with hybrid forms or 
vertical integration, whereas those based on public certifications (like PDO, for example) look to 
market-like institutions as possible solutions for coordinating vertical relationships. 
Based on this theoretical conceptualization of transaction organization, we expect that the 
introduction of an IPM system should lead to the reorganization of dyadic relations from market forms 
to hybrid forms of exchange. These hybrid forms involve the adoption of contracts between farmers or 
manufactures with retailers. The new organization of dyadic relations appears more efficient and 
allows long-term interactions. According to Gulati and Singh [46], this governance form represents a 
sort of contractual, strategic alliance that embodies a certain degree of hierarchy; the form is 
characterized by a greater extent of control and coordination (compared to market forms). 
Nevertheless, the study presents some limitations connected to the theoretical framework used for 
analysis. Transaction cost economics mostly focuses on interdependencies within dyads, whereas those 
across dyads are not considered [47]. This means that the descriptive analysis is mainly focused on the 
interpretation of organizational behaviors between supplier (i.e., the farmer or processor) and the 
supply chain leader (as represented by retailers).  
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4. Method 
4.1. The Research Design 
As we mentioned before, the study is focused on the analysis of the effects of environmental 
sustainability standards, namely those incident to IPM, on the vertical organization between dyads 
within food supply chains. Specifically, we consider the dyadic relations between retailers and farmers, 
and between retailers and processors. We choose TCE as our theoretical approach for understanding 
and explaining changes in supply chain organization. 
The main hypothesis we test in the empirical analysis concerns the idea that the introduction of 
sustainability standards leads to a modification of transaction characteristics and costs in dyadic 
relations. The empirical investigation is concentrated on the identification of variables that can be 
associated with the variation of transaction characteristics and costs (after the introduction of said 
sustainability standards). 
We expect an increase of transaction asset specificity. This is connected to the fact that for the 
implementation of IPM systems, the suppliers (i.e., farmers or processors) have to make specific 
investments to implement both the pest management system and, often, the traceability system 
connected to the application of IPM standards. Specific adjustments in the production process are 
required, especially at farm level (e.g., with respect to chemical input reduction, crop rotation, 
alternative cultivation techniques, the use of resistant/tolerant cultivars, balanced fertilization, etc.). 
Also, new procedures must be applied in order to collect and process information concerning processes 
and products. Moreover, new skills are required for suppliers, and training activities are necessary to 
implement the system. On the other side, the retailers are involved in the selection of suppliers able to 
guarantee the correct execution of IPM standards. These elements lead to an increase of bilateral 
dependency between the agents of the supply chain (in our case between farmers/processors and 
retailers). Consequently, the retailers experience increased switching costs that reflect the greater 
difficulty of finding substitute suppliers. The implementation of these standards should also lead to a 
growth in the level of collaboration and trust in the dyadic relations. 
With regard to transaction uncertainty variation, the implementation of IPM standards should lead 
to a higher level of transparency in dyadic relations. This is due to the increase of information 
exchanged in transactions (i.e., information asymmetry would be reduced). 
Concerning transaction costs, the implementation of an IPM system should bring about variations in 
transaction costs. These costs include information costs (for example, the time needed to select 
suppliers), negotiating costs (for example, the time needed to negotiate new contract conditions),  
and monitoring costs (for example, the costs needed to control the compliance of processes with the 
rules established). 
The increase of bilateral dependency, and the changes of transaction costs, should determine a 
variation in transaction governance incident to the application of IPM standards. Consequently, new 
forms of transaction governance would be introduced to reduce transaction costs (namely hybrid 
forms). These forms are generally written contracts concerning dyadic relations between retailers and 
farmers, or retailers and processors. 
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Our analysis is focused on retailers’ private labels. We utilized case study research in order to 
investigate the main changes related to vertical coordination that result from the introduction of an 
IPM system. The exploratory nature of our analysis justifies the small number of cases studied. We 
selected four case studies, which represent different typologies of retailers, and which all play 
important roles in the Italian market. Two of the cases involve national retailers (cases A and B), and 
the other two involve multinational firms, one of which is a discount business (cases C and D). 
In our analysis, we involved the product managers of the chosen retailers. To conduct the analysis, 
we selected those private labels that are oriented toward the adoption of an IPM system. The choice of 
concentrating our attention only on private labels is twofold. First, private labels represent an 
important part of the products present on the market. In 2010, their market share was around 24% for 
fresh and frozen products, and 18% for packaged food [48]. Second, the adoption of an 
environmentally-friendly system for private labels means that retailers will engage in a reorganization 
of vertical relationships within the supply chain; such reorganization should determine important 
variations in vertical coordination. 
We conducted face-to-face interviews to study the dyadic relations in the supply chain of private 
label fresh products. The questionnaire was structured with open answers in order to capture the 
variables that better describe the variations related to transaction characteristics and costs, as well as 
the organizational adjustments in the partners of the supply chain that resulted from the introduction of 
an IPM system. With the interviews, we tried to capture similarities and differences among the retailers 
in relation to the effects on governance forms incident to implementing an IPM system. 
After a brief description of the general aspects of the retailers, and of the private labels adopted by 
them, the case study analysis focuses on changes in transaction characteristics due to the introduction 
of IPM, in terms of asset specificity and uncertainty. With regard to asset specificity, questions 
investigate changes in human, geographical, and material asset specificity (i.e., supplier selection 
activity, training personnel, difficulty in supplier substitution, changes in collaboration and trust degree 
in vertical relations, implementation of traceability, and implementation of IPM standards). 
Concerning the transaction uncertainty, questions refer to the increase of information flow in the 
dyadic relations of a supply chain (i.e., the reduction of information asymmetry). Afterwards, the 
analysis investigates the variations in transaction costs, in terms of information (for example, the time 
needed to select suppliers), negotiating (for example, the time need to accomplish negotiation), and 
monitoring costs (for example, the costs needed to verify supplier production process, and the cost 
needed to monitor the system). The last part regards the changes in the governance structure of the 
supply chain due to the adoption of the IPM system. 
4.2. The Case Studies 
Case A concerns one of the largest Italian retailers. It was founded at the end of the fifties, and it 
has more than a hundred different stores in Italy, which are subdivided into supermarkets and 
superstores. The retailer’s main strategy is to offer a variety of high-quality food products and to 
promote the sustainability of food production. This retailer has four different private labels. One label 
specifically refers to conventionally processed food. Another label sorts products with specific 
sensorial features and renown within the Italian culinary tradition; examples include fresh pasta, olive 
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oil, fish, jam, butter, pizza, chocolate, and other products of the confectionery industry. The third label 
relates to organic farming, and provides both fresh and processed food products. Finally, the last 
private label sets a specific quality and environmentally-friendly scheme, and implements an IPM system 
for products such as beef and chicken, fruits and vegetables, fish, and eggs. The diverse private label 
product lines have different quality assurance schemes. Case A referred to the last private label described. 
Case B concerns a retailer that aims to create a strong collaboration between food producers/processors 
and consumers. The retailer has different products with private labels, which represent more than 25% 
of the total food turnover. The private labels include several quality attributes of products. One 
identifies those Italian products with a special gastronomic heritage. Another one refers to those 
products that use fair trade as a distribution channel. The third refers to organic products, whereas the 
fourth comprehends those food products that can have healthy effects. The fifth identifies products 
characterized by a low price range, and the sixth one refers to products for babies. There is also 
another label which has been present on the market since the end of the eighties, and represents all the 
products of the retailer that have been produced with an IPM system. To implement this system, all the 
products are traced through voluntary certification, which assures specific controls concerning all 
supply chain agents and the safety attributes of their food products. This private label is applied to the 
following products: fresh fruit and vegetables, fresh meat (i.e., chicken and red meat), and eggs. For 
fresh fruit and vegetables, this private label refers to those products with an environmentally-friendly 
production process, which saves until the 70% of chemical matters. For meat and eggs, the standard 
and label scheme assures safe feeding rules. For example, the scheme assures that the food is GMO 
free, lacks animal protein and fats, is free of coloring, and that any meat comes from animals that are 
extensively reared. 
Case C refers to a multinational retailer operating in Italy. The retailer has different private labels. 
The first identifies the label for organic products. The second one comprehends specialties, which have 
specific flavors and higher price ranges (compared to the average price of similar products). The third 
identifies basic food with the lowest price. The fourth refers to local products, and the fifth, to those 
products that use fair trade principles for production and distribution. The sixth identifies products for 
babies. In addition to these private labels, there is one which has been created to guarantee the highest 
degree of food safety and quality, and implements an environmentally-friendly scheme. The products 
which have this private label are fresh products (e.g., fresh meat, fruit, and vegetables). The IPM 
system is adopted for producing and processing these products; all the steps of the supply chain are 
characterized by a sophisticated traceability system. For meat, this label assures specific feeding rules 
and extensive breeding. For fruit and vegetables the production is based on procedures that guarantee 
environmental sustainability and a high level of food safety. 
The last case study (case D) refers to a discount operation within Italian territory. The retailer has 
many private labels, one of which concerns organic products, while others concern healthy food, and 
products that use the fair trade principles in production and distribution. No private labels are 
connected to products that make use of the IPM system during production. However, the retailer is 
certified by GLOBALG.A.P, which is a certification aimed at conforming producers to standards of 
food safety, sustainable production, responsible use of water, worker health and safety, and animal 
welfare. GLOBALG.A.P requires, among other things, an approach to farming aimed at building good 
practices in production to preserve the environment for generations to come. This approach includes 
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the most responsible use of chemicals in food production. It also means careful pest control 
management through techniques that involve IPM standards. 
In all cases analyzed, the IPM system is applied to undifferentiated and fresh products (e.g., fruits 
and vegetables, meat, etc.). The main reason for this strategy is to enable the retailer to differentiate 
products in terms of sustainability, safety, and quality assurance. 
5. Results 
The interviews revealed some interesting aspects related to the effects of IPM system introduction 
on vertical relationships within supply chains (Table 1). 
With regard to the changes in transaction characteristics, in the systems implemented to guarantee a 
sustainable production (i.e., cases A, B, C) the analysis has shown an increase in asset specificity and a 
decrease in transaction uncertainty. The positive relationship with asset specificity is due to the higher 
bilateral dependency among supply chains agents. The increase of bilateral dependency among the 
agents of the chain is mainly due to: 
- the activity of supplier selection; 
- the training of selected suppliers; 
- the investment needed for IPM implementation. 
The retailer has two main tasks for the supplier’s selection. On one hand, the retailer has to select 
those suppliers that can guarantee established quality and quantity levels [49]. On the other hand, the 
retailer must be sure that the supplier puts the effort required to produce on the basis of IPM standards. 
Indeed, important factors that affect supplier selection are firm size and entrepreneurial capability. 
Supplier selection and the process of adaptation to a new standard can take a long time (e.g., between 6 
and 12 months). If the retailer judgment is positive, the retailer may actively support the supplier in  
the adjustment process, so as to help the supplier implement pest management rules by providing 
specific training. 
Once the suppliers are selected, the agents invest in instruments, which allow them to manage and 
control IPM products. The adoption of an IPM system necessitates the implementation of software that 
is able to manage the rules related to IPM production, as well as a traceability system that would allow 
for a precise management of the batches along the supply chains. These adjustments allow the retailer to 
better monitor the activities of the supply chain agents. The respondents stated an increase of collaboration 
between retailer and suppliers, a growth of trust, and a higher difficulty in supplier substitution. 
With respect to transaction uncertainty, the respondents stated that the implementation of the IPM 
system leads to a lower degree of uncertainty (as a result of the new rules in the production processes 
and the consequent higher flows of information exchanged). 
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Table 1. The effects of an integrated pest management (IPM) system on transaction characteristics, costs, and vertical coordination. 
 
IPM products Variation of transaction characteristics Variation of transaction costs Variation of vertical coordination 
  
Asset specificity (+) 
Transaction 
uncertainty (-) 




Fruits and vegetables; 
fresh meat; processed 




Selection of suppliers; 
















Cost to verify supplier 
production process; 
cost to monitor the 
system 
Centralisation of vertical 
relationships; increase of 
supplier liability; product rule 





Fruits and vegetables; 
fresh meat; eggs 
Increase of collaboration; 
increase of trust;  difficulty 
in supplier substitution; 
implementation of 
traceability; implementation 
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implementation of 
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milk; chocolate; tea; 
orange juice; sugar 
 
Higher transparency 
along the supply 
chain 
  
Cost to verify supplier 
production process   
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An increase in transaction asset specificity increases the transaction costs between a retailer and its 
selected suppliers. The interviews highlighted the increase in information, negotiation, and monitoring 
costs. With regard to information costs, the retailers make reference to the time spent for the suppliers’ 
selection. Negotiating costs arise in connection with the time spent to negotiate the new production 
conditions, such as the quantity to be produced and the price of ―sustainable products‖. Monitoring 
costs relate to the expenditure faced by the retailer for implementing IPM system controls. The 
implementation of an IPM system necessitates a considerable amount of monitoring activity by the 
retailer, both ex-ante and ex-post. The ex-ante monitoring refers to all activities carried out by the 
retailer in order to assess the firms’ ability to perform the contract. The ex-post monitoring considers 
all controls the retailer plans in order to verify the accuracy of the procedures. 
With regard to the governance structure of transactions along the supply chains, the implementation 
of the IPM system leads to a variation in dyadic relations, mainly with respect to: 
(a). new hybrid forms (i.e., namely dyadic contracts); 
(b). centralized organization of vertical relationships. 
The first one concerns the rules incident to implementing an IPM scheme, which guarantee the 
introduction of agricultural practices oriented toward protecting the environment. With these new 
organizational forms, new responsibilities for the supply chain agents and specific controls are 
established. Through dyadic contracts, a new formalization of all specific rules of IPM production and 
new contractual conditions that are related to the price and the suppliers’ and retailers’ liabilities are 
provided. Thanks to this new form of transacting, the uncertainty of transacting is reduced by an 
augmentation of the information formalized by the agreement. 
The second refers to the purchasing strategy for private label products, which involves a centralized 
mode of supply chain relationship organization. The centralization of the IPM system results in 
retailers assuming a leadership role within the supply chain. This means that the retailer has to manage 
the activities of the other agents, design the dyadic contracts, coordinate the information, and arrange 
the controls [27]. 
6. Conclusions 
IPM standards are one of the most important tools guaranteeing the sustainability of food production 
at the international level. Nevertheless, diverse schemes are available in different countries. In our analysis, 
IPM systems are private standards, and in most of the cases, are individual company standards that are 
set down by retailers for their private label products. The survey we conducted revealed in most of the 
cases that the implementation of an IPM system entails a reorganization of supply chains. 
Through the case studies presented in this paper, it was possible to identify the main changes in 
transaction characteristics, costs, and vertical coordination that result from implementing an IPM 
system. Results show that the introduction of this system leads to a growth of the bilateral dependency 
due to an increase of asset specificity among supply chain agents and a reduction of the degree of 
transaction uncertainty, related to the increased transaction transparency. The bilateral dependency 
results in mainly two specificities: human asset specificity (i.e., the activity of supplier selection, the 
training of selected suppliers, the difficulty in supplier substitution, the increase of collaboration and 
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trust in the dyadic relation between retailer and farmer/processor, etc.) and material asset specificity 
(i.e., the investment needed to implement an IPM and traceability systems). 
The variation in transaction characteristics leads to changes in transaction costs, such as information 
costs, which are primarily connected to the time needed to select suppliers for the IPM system. The 
retailer looks for suppliers that are able to respect the conditions imposed by the system and to comply 
with retailer’s requirements.  
The implementation of such a system also leads to higher negotiating costs that are related to the 
time spent to accomplish negotiations between retailers and suppliers, and for the elaboration of new 
contractual conditions. Moreover, introducing an IPM system entails monitoring costs. Such costs are 
related to controls that the retailers have to face both ex ante, i.e., during the processing, and ex post, 
i.e., on final products. 
Therefore, the main hypothesis of the study is verified. The analysis has shown that the IPM system 
implemented by retailers for private labels modifies the governance structure of the dyadic relations in 
supply chains. The changes in transaction characteristics and costs lead to hybrid forms of transaction 
governance (namely dyadic contracts). As the degree of bilateral dependency between 
farmer/processor and retailer is quite high, the dyadic relations are based on written contracts, where 
the conditions of the agreement are expressed. According to the literature, dyadic contracts for the 
adoption of IPM standards are similar to the hybrid forms linked to private quality labeling schemes 
where reputational capital plays an important role. 
The dyadic contracts involve organizational adjustments among partners and a centralized 
organizational form for vertical relationships. The retailer becomes the leader of the supply chain, and 
manages the IPM system by verifying that standards are properly applied.  
Important implications of the results highlighted by our analysis concern the stability over time, the 
strong vertical coordination, and the efficient organization of the dyadic relations in supply chains 
designed to apply these kinds of environmental sustainability systems. These may generate advantages 
for the different agents of the supply chains, including farmers and small manufacturers. Nevertheless, 
a critical point can be the strong market power of the retailers that promote this system.  
The benefits of long-run relationships involve both retailer and farmer/processor. The advantage for 
the retailer concerns the availability of a set of selected suppliers that guarantee compliance with IPM 
standards and multiple trading conditions, such as food safety and quality requirements, the established 
quantity of product, the certainty of price and cost, and so on. These features play a fundamental role 
for private label products, as the retailer particularly cares about the reputation of these kinds of 
products and their brand image. 
On the other side, the benefits of long-run relations for the farmer and for the small processor can 
be connected to certainty of production trading, the knowledge of the marketing price, the efficiency of 
the production process, the innovative technology applied, and so on. Therefore, even though the 
dyadic relations between retailer and farmer/processor are characterized by an imbalance of market 
power due to the retailer’s large size, a sort of economic balance can exist in the trading relations for 
both transacting agents; both can benefit from the advantages of long-term relations. 
Future studies should verify these results on a larger sample of supply chains, and test the economic 
benefits for farmers and small processors (as revealed through empirical analyses). Moreover, future 
research may be focused on the study of the interdependencies across dyads in order to study 
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organization mechanisms at the chain level, and verify whether the results supported by transaction 
cost literature are confirmed through a wider set of interdependencies. 
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